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1 Introduction
The night of February 17th, 1864 the seas were calm and the skies were clear, it was the
perfect weather the Hunley’s crew had been waiting for. They departed for USS Housatonic
with the tide and reached the ship after just a few hours. The crew’s mission was to place
a lethal charge of black powder on the hull of Housatonic and return to shore as quickly as
possible. The Hunley successfully sank Housatonic, making it the first successful submarine
attack in history. Having completed the mission, the submarine disappeared into the night,
creating a mystery that continues to puzzle the general public for almost 150 years. Many
people over the years have tried but failed to recover the submarine themselves and solve
this mystery. It was not until August 8th, 2000, when the vessel was finally recovered, and
began the preservation process that new details would come to light about exactly how the
Hunley sank.
A challenge in investigating the loss of the submarine is the lack of basic naval architec-
ture analysis on the vessel. As the recovery and archaeological work has continued, questions
about the vessel’s operation and potential loss scenarios have become more detailed. To
help answer these questions, naval architecture simulation of the vessel’s operation become
essential. This report outlines initial work on the displacement, trim, stability, propulsion,
and damage stability of the vessel. Initially, the methodology followed is outlined in detail.
This is then followed by a recap of the historical information that has been gathered on the
submarine and its operations. Then a number of potential loss scenarios are outlined, leading
to a series of naval architecture investigations. These investigations are presented, followed
by conclusions.
2 Methodology
The approach was divided into desk research, field visits, experimental investigations, and
computer simulations. A literature review was completed, focusing on historical accounts
of the design, construction, two training accidents, and final mission of the Hunley. More
recent documentation on the discovery, and archaeological investigations was also collected
and compared against historical documentation when completing future tasks.
Using the available documentation and archaeological data, a baseline weight estimate was
completed using the Expanded Ship Work Breakdown Structure (ESWBS) format. Clear
records were kept justifying the calculations to aid in future refinement of the weight esti-
mate. Additionally, point cloud scan data of the hull and internals was used to develop a
geometric model of the main hull, ballast system, and key elements of the propulsion system.
Completing the weight estimate lead and the vessel geometry allowed a hydrostatics model
with internal compartments and tanks to be generated. The model is capable of simulating
various flooding and ballast operations through a hydrostatics program. Experimental tests
of flooding through damage observed on the vessels, as vessel resistance and propulsion com-
pleted the investigations. Based on the investigations, conclusions on the potential scenarios
discussed are presented.
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3 Background
In order to complete the analysis of how the Hunley sank, it is important to understand how
the vessel was developed, the events that led up to the attack and historical references that
mention the Hunley. This section will go through the conception of the Hunley to the last
known reference of where the Hunley was after the attack. This section is a compilation of
secondary sources, and is designed to give engineers and Naval Architects a broad overview
of the vessel to help place analysis in context. Not all source conflicts or potential interpreta-
tions are presented, historically-focused investigations are recommended to read the primary
archaeological reports directly. As is standard practice for engineering report, page numbers
within sources are not given.
3.1 Historical Context
The H.L. Hunley was named after Horace L. Hunley, the principal investor and innovator of
the Hunley. Horace was deputy collector of customs, as well as a wealthy lawyer and planter.
He worked closely with James McClintock and Baxter Watson in the design of the first three
Civil War Submarines. James McClintock and Baxter Watson were previously steam engine
part suppliers that came up with the idea of an underwater vessel; Horace Hunley joined them
in 1861 because he understood the importance of maintaining shipping lanes to Europe [14].
Their first endeavor was the Pioneer built in 1861. The Pioneer was a 20 foot, three man,
hand powered vessel designed to tow a floating torpedo to the target. The vessel had a
successful concept test, but was scuttled and later recovered - by the Union Army before
being used in the war. The American Diver was the next venture in 1862 located in Mobile,
Alabama. This vessel was originally planned as a 36 foot steam or electric driven vessel, but
the final design was for a crew of five: four to crank and one to steer. The American Diver
was also designed to tow a torpedo and in 1863 was sent to destroy the Union blockade.
However the American Diver was too slow to be successful. The submarine ultimately sank
under tow in Mobile Bay during a storm. Although there was no loss of life in the loss of the
vessel, it was never recovered. The H.L. Hunley was the final project of Hunley, McClintock,
and Watson. A 40 foot, eight man, hand powered vessel ready to improve upon the previous
failures of the team.
The Hunley was built in 1863 in Mobile, Alabama. The submarine was shipped by rail
to Charleston, South Carolina where she would under go testing. The first test held August
29th left harbor with a new crew of nine. The submarine immediately sank, killing five of
the crew members. The reported cause, stated by a surviving member of the flooded subma-
rine, Charles Hasker, was the O cer in charge stepped on the dive plane lever causing the
vessel to dive while the hatches were still open [14]. An alternate cause, written into Colonel
Charles H. Olmstead’s report, was the Hunley became entangled in ropes, was drawn to the
side and went down [14]. On September 14th, the Hunley was salvaged and was readied for
additional tests. Between the first and second failure, the vessel did complete several trials
successfully returning to port [2]. The second test was held October 15th and departed with
a crew of eight, including Horace Hunley. The vessel submerged normally, but after several
hours, it was clear that the submarine was not going to resurface. Divers went to recover the
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submarine and found that it was stuck in the mud bow first at a steep angle. It appeared
that Horace Hunley was at the helm when the vessel hit. The reported probable cause was
an open valve, that over filled the forward ballast tank and spilled back into the main com-
partment where it could not be pumped back into the sea [14]. This time the crew had used
measures to attempt an escape; The aft tank was pumped dry, and the keel block release
bolts had been partially turned. It appeared that six of the crew drowned from the overflow
in the forward ballast, while Horace Hunley and Thomas Park tried opening the forward and
aft hatches to escape. After the second failure, the vessel underwent maintenance; stu ng
boxes were repacked and the compass was replaced [14].
Once the Hunley was repaired, additional testing revealed areas of the submarine that could
be improved. The towed torpedo configuration proved e↵ective but di cult to control deto-
nation, this provoked the change to the spar configuration around January 10th, 1864 [14].
The crew also discovered that they could be towed a few miles out into the harbor by David
torpedo boats, then disconnect and go about their mission. Events turned around on January
5th, 1864 when a report was released to the Union Navy from two Confederate deserters that
listed the exact details of the Hunley. Shortly after, the Union Navy warned all their vessels
of a submarine attack, and they responded by placing nets and chains in hope of deterring
the Hunley. George Dixon, who was now the captain of the Hunley moved the Hunley from
Mount Pleasant to Sullivan’s Island. With the current crew configuration, an additional
attempt was scheduled for on January 20th. It is unclear if this mission took place and the
vessel returned without finding a suitable target, or if bad weather canceled the mission. On
February 5th, the final Hunley crew was set; William Alexander was called away on business
while Wicks returned. Alexander was reportedly replaced by two new recruits. With the
crew set, it was time to prove the Hunley’s worth.
The Housatonic was a sloop of war that consistently anchoring around four miles o↵shore [14].
As one of the closest vessels to the Hunley’s base, it was either selected as a target or simply
emerged as the natural target for the mission. Dixon’s plan was to wait for calm seas, then
attack, signaling back to shore with a signal, (reportedly a calcium light but no such device
has yet been found on the vessel), once the mission was complete. Dixon and his crew be-
gan their preparations on the afternoon of February 17th, they had the calm seas they were
waiting for, and the time was right to attack the Housatonic.
Understanding the context of the Hunley is important to determine how the vessel evolved
with testing. Elements such as the spar added more additional control of the torpedo, while
the compass proved to be prone to breaking under extreme scenarios (having to be replaced
at least two times in the life of the vessel [14]). Observing how the vessel previously sank
will provide important details about how the Hunley sank on the final mission. Knowing
that the dive plane lever was sensitive enough to cause the vessel to dive into the ground
within seconds if bumped; or an open valve could cause the forward ballast tank to flood
over faster than the ballast pumps could handle are both important clues to the behavior of
the submarine.
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3.2 Timeline
Every witness of the Hunley attack on February 17th, 1864 recalls approximately the same
events with varying level of detail. This section will combine these accounts to present the
entire picture until the Hunley’s disappearance. At 7:00pm the Hunley was loaded pierside
and started the journey to the Union blockade [7, 14]. At 8:40pm, the Hunley was spotted by
the forward lookout of the USS Housatonic approximately 400 ft away. A secondary crewman
spotted the Hunley at 300 ft around 8:45pm. Just before 9:00pm, the Housatonic identified
the Hunley as a threat and the crew was given the order to slip the anchor and fire up the
boilers. The reported blast was just before 9:00pm. The Housatonic sank between three and
five minutes later, settling on the bottom of the harbor at 9:00pm [7]. Colin and Russell the
Hunley as ramming the Housatonic as almost three hours after leaving shore, which would
place departure at 6:00pm, but they do not cite a source [5]. Others state that the sinking
time as 8:45pm and 9:00pm based on the accounts of di↵erent O cers stationed on the USS
Canandaigua, the vessel to respond to the attack of the Housatonic [13]. William Alexander
suggests that based on previous operating conditions the Hunley ran under the water while
surfacing periodically for air replenishment and to navigate [2].
The details of the events that followed are scarce and pieced together from naval court
inquiries. The Housatonic’s crew released two life boats saving most of the crew, while five
men are believed to have died in the incident. While the Housatonic was under attack,
several accounts state that the Hunley was under rifle fire until the explosion. One account
from Charles Craven, a crewman aboard the Housatonic, suggests that a 32 pound gun was
loaded and aimed at the Hunley but was never fired because of the torpedo blast [14]. It is
aslo believed that the sub was too low and close to the vessel for the heavy guns to depress
su ciently to aim at the submarine. The United States Navy Board of Inquiry after the
incident, as well as additional crew testimonies, suggests that the Hunley was closer to the
Housatonic than was originally planned. From Sullivan’s Island, a report was recorded as
having seen the blue light confirming that the vessel’s mission was complete and they would
be returning [14]. Records also show that the blue light was spotted from the rigging of
the Housatonic [13, 14]. On February 19th, a report was filed by the Commanding O cer
of Sullivan’s Island, General Ripley, that they had not heard from the Hunley and he fears
the vessel was captured or sank. On the same date from the Union side, a report was sent
to the Union blockade stating to be weary of similar attacks such as the Housatonic [13].
On February 29th, The Daily Courier published on that the Hunley returned safely. On
March 7th, the Union Naval Court of Inquiry released a statement about the sinking of the
Housatonic but made no reference to what happened to the Hunley. On March 10th, the
Hunley was o cially considered lost [13].
Now that the timeline has been established up until the Hunley was o cially considered
missing, historical records will be discussed in order to list any clues leading to the Hunley’s
disappearance.
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3.3 Brief Description of the Vessel
Based on the actual vessel remains, the vessel today is becoming better understood. See
Appendix A for a brief discussion of several important historical sources, some of which have
been proved accurate and others of which are now known to be in error. Additionally, recent
work on the reconstruction of the vessel has recently been published [16]. The vessel itself
consists of three main regions: a bow section, stern section, and a mid-body region. Overall,
the vessel is 40 feet long, 3 feet 6 inches wide, and 4 feet tall. The oval mid-section appears
to be formed by adding a flat expansion plate to a circular pressure vessel, with roughly
straight bow and stern sections tapering into a large castings, which formed a vertical stem
and stern profile. A historical painting of the complete vessel that has proven fairly accurate
is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: 1863 painting of the vessel by Conrad Chapman
The vessel’s structure is reinforced by internal frames, typically split into two half-ovals
(presumably for installation) and then pressure fit into the oval midbody. The vessel has
numerous appendages:
• Two hatch towers, fore and aft, that served for crew entry/exit, with the forward one
also used for conning the vessel. They are approximately circular with portholes for
visibility. It is believed each had cutwaters in front of them.
• A snorkel box aft of the fore hatch, which had tubes and a simple mechanism for air
exchange without fully surfacing.
• A box keel with detachable ballast weights along the bottom centerline.
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• A set of forward dive planes. These were long and narrow plates mounted on a pivot,
and their angle could be controlled from within the sub.
• Propeller, propeller shroud, rudder, and supporting brackets and control rod near the
stern,
Internally, the vessel features two ballast tanks, one fore, one aft. Each is separated from the
main centeral compartment by a partial bulkhead, with space at the top to allow air exchange
(and also allow the possibility of progressive flooding into the central compartment). Each
was equiped with a fill line, and connected to a pumping system for emptying. Aft of the
forward ballast tank was the commander’s station, with controls for the dive planes, rudder,
and basic instruments. Aft of the commander’s station, seven additional crew members
were housed along a long crank which turned the propeller. The crew members turned the
crank with their arms, and had a small bench to rest against. The crank went through a
set of gears, and then exited the vessel aft to turn the propeller. Permanent ballasting was
installed throughout, using various sized iron blocks. The combination of the iron ballast and
the variable water ballast would allow the vessel fully submerge, or run in a semi-submerged
mode with the top of the hull awash and only the hatch towers and snorkel box above the
water. The vessel originally was designed to tow a large charge behind it, diving under the
target ship and running the charge into the vessel. However, it was modified to use a charge
attached to a spar arrangement in front of the vessel, which it would ram into the vessel.
This was similar to the setup used by the small David boats, another asymmetric attack
vessel employed by the Confederacy [11].
3.4 Features of the Attack Site
In addition to understanding the features of the Hunley, the characteristics of the attack site
are also important. This section will outline historical accounts of the harbor and weather
conditions surrounding the attack.
A report prepared by Executive O cer Higginson of the Housatonic suggests what weather
conditions the Hunley was up against the night of February 17th. He states there was a
force 2 North West wind, and the Housatonic was anchored in about 28 feet of water. Their
relative position was about 6 miles from Fort Sumter and 2.5 miles from Sullivan’s Island.
From his testimony after the attack he states the Hunley was approaching at 3 or 4 knots,
targeting just forward of the mizzen mast on the starboard side. He stated the Housatonic
was attempting to escape, having had the engines fired up and the anchor cable slipped, at
which point the torpedo had exploded.
The o cial report released by the Naval O cers presented with the case of the Housatonic
lists certain details as follows. They state the Housatonic sank around 9pm on February 17th.
She was anchored in 27 feet of water, with a bearing that was east south-east about 5.5 miles
o↵ the coast of Fort Sumter. The weather was listed as being clear, with bright moonlight
and a moderate northward and westward wind, the tide was at half ebb. A floating object
was discovered between 8:45pm and 9pm by a lookout stationed on the starboard side, about
75 or 100 yards out that appeared to be a log. The object was listed as having a speed of 3
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or 4 knots in the direction of the starboard quarter of the ship. Gun fire was opened on the
vessel until the Hunley came into contact with the starboard quarter.
Multiple reports suggest that the blue light had been spotted from the Housatonic and
the troops at Sullivan’s Island. The O cer in charge of Sullivan’s Island at the time reported
that the agreed upon signals had been shown, and they responded by exposing a light on
shore that would allow the Hunley to return safely. Evidence that the troops could indeed
see that far out to sea is provided by McLaurin stating that they could see the commotion
of frantic signaling between the blockade vessels.
The pre-disturbance survey completed before recovering the Hunley presents important in-
formation about the location and orientation of the submarine. The vessel was sitting in
approximately 30 feet of water orientated with the bow at 297 degrees relative to magnetic
north, which points it almost directly at Sullivan’s Island. The Hunley was located about 4
nautical miles from the coast of Sullivan’s Island, under three feet of sediment. The vessel
was canted about 45 degrees starboard. This location is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Relative location and orientation of the Housatonic and Hunley
In addition to the pre-disturbance survey, a site map was completed to help layout the
battlefield and how it changed over time. This survey produced four objects: The Housatonic,
the Hunley, the third anomaly which is a buoy, and a fourth anomaly which is an anchor and
chain. Figure 3 below presents the layout of objects based on a magnetometer reading.
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Figure 3: Magnetometer reading of the battle site completed in 1998.
In 1864, nine months after the attack, investigators were instructed to drag an area of 500
yards around the Housatonic but found nothing of the Hunley. In 1872, the Army Corps of
Engineers were contracted to remove the Hunley wreck and clear the Housatonic wreck to
20 feet below the water line; the Hunley was also not found during this mission. A coastal
survey also shows a navigation buoy was placed at the location of the wreck (third anomaly
in Figure 3). In 1909, the Housatonic was again deemed a navigation hazard, and another
six feet of hull was removed. Records indicate that the hull was cut down to be even with
the seafloor [5]. In 1872, a South Carolina Coast survey shows that a buoy was initially
marking the Housatonic as a navigation hazard, however when the wreck was cut flush with
the seafloor, the buoy was cut as well. When comparing this position to the coastal survey,
the buoy was measured as 430 feet away from the Hunley’s current location, and 915 feet
from the current location of the Housatonic. The forth anomaly is an anchor with the chain
pointing to the Housatonic; However, the entire length was not recovered, and it is deemed
unrelated to the battle site [5]. In 1877, to control the flow of sediment coming from the river,
construction on two jetties was started. These were completed in 1895 ultimately a↵ecting
the sediment distribution over the Housatonic and Hunley. The sediment distribution change
timeline is not precisely known, but overall it supports the recovery timeline [5]. Figure 5
presents the relative location of the Housatonic and Hunley to the jetties and Sullivan’s
Island, while Figure 4 shows the channel before the jetties were constructed.
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Figure 4: Relative sediment flow presented prior to 1877 when the jetties were constructed
Figure 5: Relative sediment flow presented in 1990
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It can be determined from the battlefield survey that the attack was a precision maneuver.
Witnesses on the Housatonic reported that the Hunley changed direction after surfacing,
aiming for the vessel’s mizzenmast and the vessel’s stern with its overhanging counter. It
is also possible that the Hunley’s crew knew the layout of the vessel, and that the weapon
storage magazine was located around the mizzenmast, which would cause the most damage
if hit properly. The hull had a sharp deadrise which would be in the Housatonic’s blind spot,
giving the crew ample time to place the torpedo. The final resting place of the Housatonic
and Hunley are about 1000 feet apart, with the bow of the Hunley pointed 297 degrees, and
the Housatonic is angled at 316 degrees; Both are pointing towards the general direction of
the ebb tide. Two eye witnesses, one crew member of Housatonic and one of the response
crew reported seeing a blue light signal. However, it is not clear if this was from the Hunley,
another source, or not related to the action as others did not report the light. If this was
the Hunley, it would indicate that the vessel was on the surface roughly 50 minutes after the
attack. One source [5] makes note that the Hunley crew would have to expend significant
energy to stay close to the Housatonic for 50 minutes after the attack, and mentions that
they may have anchored to pass the time. How the crew may have anchored, and the adjust-
ments to the submarine’s trim and buoyancy to carry this out are not clear. No anchoring
arrangements have been found on the submarine to date, though a small grapple anchor was
found near, but not inside or connected to the submarine. The origins, and relationship to
the sub, if any, of this anchor are unclear. It could have been carried by the submarine, or
may also have been a grapple anchor used to try to locate the submarine after the loss by
the Union Navy.
4 Scenarios
To help focus the investigation, a number of potential scenarios for the loss of the vessel were
assembled. The scenarios in which the Hunley sank have been presented in di↵erent sources
throughout history. Many scenarios also came about after the Hunley was recovered and new
evidence was found on the hull.
In 1864, there was very little known about how to properly design a submarine, therefore
trial and error was used when designing most of the components of the Hunley. This meant
several design characteristics that could lead to the Hunley’s own demise. The first charac-
teristic brought into question is whether or not the vessel was underpowered, and unable to
fight the tide back to shore; or if it was ine cient enough that the crew tired too quickly
to power the vessel back. Very few historical references show the exact numbers in terms of
velocity or range of the vessel, so the scenario looking to be answered is: was the Hunley too
underpowered to fight the tide, and drifted until it sank? This theory is supported by James
McClintock believing the tide was strong, and they drifted for a few hours before ultimately
sinking [12].
Most common theories revolve around the Hunley being damaged in the attack. Upon
recovery of the vessel, a grapefruit sized hole was found in the forward man hatch that could
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be from the Housatonic’s counter attack [12]. Was this damage caused by small arms or
rifle fire from the Housatonic, and was it enough to cause significant flooding of the Hunley’s
hull? The second damage that was uncovered with the recovery, was a sheared pipe for the
intake valve of the forward ballast tank. Is it possible to determine when the pipe seperated
from the hull fitting, and is the flow through the opening enough to cause the Hunley to
become unstable and sink? The final evidence that was found upon recovery was a detached
rudder sitting beneath the hull. Was the rudder damaged during the attack to the point is
was not operable and finally detached when the vessel settled to the sea floor?
Two scenarios were uncovered about the torpedo explosion that may have compromised
the vessel, without actually causing any damage to the hull itself. First consists of the ves-
sel’s crew being knocked unconscious from the blast. This might have caused them to drift,
until natural leaks in the vessel or another source of flooding caused the vessel to sink. The
second scenario comes from the blast causing instability in the vessel. Was the blast such
that enough water from the ballast tanks made it over the bulkhead to cause dangerous
instability and near instantaneous sinking?
The final set of scenarios comes from the Hunley surviving the attack, but unable to survive
the return journey. The first scenario consists of a successful attack, but upon opening the
forward hatch and signaling to shore, a wave came over the hatch and sank the vessel. The
second survival scenario was to retreat a safe distance from the attack site, then wait on the
sea bed, until it was su ciently safe to return to shore. While waiting, it is possible the vessel
got stuck in the seabed, or the crew died from lack of oxygen. The third scenario consists of
the Hunley intentionally grounding the vessel to hide the secrets of the submarine from the
Union Navy. Finally, A historical report from William Alexander suggests that the attack
was successful, but upon trying to retreat the vessel was stuck underneath the Housatonic,
and dragged to the bottom in the rapid sinking of the vessel [2]. The recovery of the vessel
some distance from the Housatonic makes this less likely, though the vessel could conceivably
have been damaged but managed to escape the sinking site.
The complete list of feasible scenarios gathered are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: List of analyzed scenarios
No. Description Notes
1 The Hunley was underpowered and
unable to fight the tide to shore
Will be investigated by studying re-
sistance and propulsion of the vessel.
2 A grapefruit sized hole in the forward
hatch caused significant flooding
Not investigated in current work. Sea
was calm and this hole is above the
still waterline, so flooding from this
hole would have been slow.
3 The sheared ballast pipe caused
enough flooding to cause instability
and ultimately sinking
Will be investigated along with com-
binations of scenario 5
4 The broken rudder caused su cient
loss in control that the Hunley drifted
till it sank
Not investigated in current work.
5 The crew was knocked unconscious
from the blast, and drifted until nat-
ural leaks or other flooding caused
them to sink
Investigated by NSWCCD, explosion
alone did not seem to be severe
enough to fully disable crew.
6 Significant instability caused by wa-
ter flooding over the bulkheads from
the ballast tanks caused the Hunley
to sink
Partially investigated
7 Upon signaling a successful attack,
a wave came over the forward hatch
causing the vessel to rapidly down-
flood
Not investigated in this work
8 The Hunley crew retreated a safe dis-
tance and waited on the bottom, dy-
ing from asphyxiation
Not investigated in this work
9 The Hunley crew intentionally
grounded the vessel to hide the
secrets of it construction from the
Union Navy
Not investigated in this work
10 The Hunley was unable to back away
from the Housatonic after the attack,
and was trapped underneath the hull
of the Housatonic
Not investigated as does not fit with
the battlefield archaeology. Possibly
combinable with 4, which might have
happened after the attack
As the scenario list developed, a few scenarios seemed the most interesting to investigate.
Little concrete speed evidence is currently available for the Hunley, with archival sources
giving top speeds in the 3-5 knot range, but both Alexander and McClintock expressed
reservations on the vessel’s ability to fight the tide back to shore. Thus, scenario 1 was
selected for further analysis. The new discovery of the broken pipe which led to scenario 3
indicated that this scenario would be worth exploring, along side the work of Naval Surface
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Warfare Center Carderock in investigating the impact of the blast on the occupants of the
submarine. If the blast disabled the occupants, and the vessel drifted while flooding, much
of the current battlefield archaeology would be explained. These scenarios were selected
because the authors believed at the start of this project that they are among the most likely
to explain the sinking and are among those where engineering analysis could produce the
most new information. This is not to say that the other scenarios have been completely
eliminated. Some scenarios, especially scenario 8, are virtually impossible to disprove at this
date given the information that has survived the 150-year plus since the sinking. Thus, the
work outlined here focused on gathering information and analysis for discussion of scenarios
1, 3, and 5, with the hope that some of this work will be transferable to other scenario
investigations.
5 Analysis
Having chosen three of the most likely scenarios, additional analysis can be completed to
discuss the cause of the Hunley sinking. This section will outline how drift forcing, powering
calculations, and the time to flood analysis was completed to supported the selected scenarios.
5.1 Model Development
Two models were necessary to complete the required analysis: a geometry model, and a
hydrostatics model. The geometric model was developed in RhinoCAD and was primarily
used for the weights estimation. Relying on accuracy from volume estimation, was critical for
parts that currently do not have a recorded weight. The hydrostatics model was completed
in General HydroStatics (GHS) and used primarily to determine flooding characteristics and
principle hydrostatics.
Early in the process after the recovery of the Hunley a laser scan was taken of the exte-
rior and interior of the submarine. The model was developed using primarily the exterior
laser scan. The hull surface was fit using least squares of 2D sections at multiple points along
the hull, while known measurements were used to set incomplete curvature. Items such as
the propeller, which was heavily concreted, relied on sketches from the initial recovery, and
best guess curvature based on some of the laser scan data. The final exterior model is shown
in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: CAD model estimated from laser scan data
Major interior components that have not been removed and weighed were modeled far enough
to get a volume estimation and therefore weight. Items such as the crank shaft, and fly
wheel are sized to the correct dimensions with assumptions of shape based on recorded pic-
tures. Piping was estimated using small measured sections, and approximated based on hand
drawings [15, 8]. Ballast blocks were sized based on the air calculation report provided by
Clemson [9], placed based on the laser scan, and corrected for overall geometry.
The Hydrostatics model was completed using the exterior of the geometry model. It does
not account for any interior modeling, only the final weight estimate and location of major
interior components. The GHS geometry file consists of the outer hull structure, conning
towers, snorkel box, bow planes, cutwaters, propeller assembly, rudder, forward and aft bal-
last tanks, spar, and powder keg. The model geometry omits all vessel particulars that are
not relevant in the context of the Hunley’s hydrostatic characteristics. The final geometry
file was discussed with Mr. Brian Thomas, a Professional Naval Architect/Salvage Engineer
and GHS expert at the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Center. Figure 7 below presents the
final GHS model.
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Figure 7: Final GHS model based on exterior geometry
5.2 Weight Estimation
The weight estimation was the first step to determining if the vessel would float appropri-
ately with the displaced volume of the geometry model. Once the vessel has the expected
displacement and trimming characteristics, further analysis can be completed. The estimate
was completed by stepping through from the largest components such as the hull plating
and keel ballast, to the smallest components and recorded using the Expanded Ship Work
Breakdown Structure (ESWBS) format.
A sample of plate thickness measurements were used to average the hull thickness to 0.29
inches of rolled wrought iron. The iron density used caused significant variation in weight,
so the density was calculated multiple ways. The first was to take the known weights of hull
plating [17], and using the model geometry estimate the density, which produced a value
of 17.53 slugs per cubic foot. The second was to determine period accurate iron properties
based o↵ of the element make up [3] which produced values between 14.82 and 15.11 slugs
per cubic foot. The final approximation was to compare the currently accepted standard iron
density of 15.04 slugs per cubic foot. Using each of these values, the hull structure weight
varied by 17 percent, the chosen value which brought the model into a reasonable ratio of
displacement to weight was the average of the iron density completed by the element make
up study, with a value of 14.96 slugs per cubic foot. With iron density set, the hull weight
was estimated at 5.06 LT. In addition to the exterior shell plating, hatch covers, dive planes
and keel block seen in Figure 6, the interior iron components shown in Figure 8 were included
as well.
2017-001 16
Final Report: Investigation into the Loss of the H.L. Hunley
ONR Grants # N00014-14-1-0179, N00014-15-1-2031
Figure 8: Interior components of hull structure.
The second largest weight was the interior ballast which was known to be made of pig iron.
All of the individual blocks were weighed upon removal of the vessel, and recorded along with
their overall dimensions [9]. To help verify the selected density of pig iron, the weight and
dimensions of the ballast was compared to the 1864 density based on element make up [3].
By completing this, it will also verify the accuracy of iron density previously selected. By
element make up, the range of pig iron is between 14.36 and 14.86 slugs per cubic foot. The
value calculated from the recorded weight and geometry of the ballast blocks was 14.43 slugs
per cubic foot, which is within the expected range. This density comparison was used as
only to verify the method used to calculate the weight of the hull. The weight used for the
ballast blocks in the estimate are discrete weights taken after the ballast was removed from
the submarine and cleaned.
The solid ballast block configuration used in the weight distribution is based on a complete
inventory of artifact characteristics developed during excavation. Block locations are based
on a three-dimensional laser scan of the interior of the hull; both the inventory and scan were
provided by Clemson. The scan was taken with the Hunley in its sunken condition with a 45
degree heel to starboard. Given the need to shift the laser-scanned block configuration to fit
within the upright computer model, and since it is impossible to know how blocks may have
shifted during and after the attack, it was necessary to make assumptions in identifying the
transverse and vertical locations of each block. It was assumed that the blocks were largely
undisturbed longitudinally as they were held in place by the vessel’s framing.
The blocks were arranged according to compartment and weight into four ballast groups:
permanent solid ballast in the forward ballast tank, permanent solid ballast in the aft ballast
tank, permanent solid ballast in the main compartment, and movable solid ballast in the
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main compartment. All ballast blocks greater than 70 pounds were considered permanent,
as it is improbable that the crew could manually move these blocks once at their stations. In
contrast, all ballast blocks 70 pounds or less were considered to be movable, as it is realistic
to assume that the crew could move these blocks to adjust the heel and trim of the vessel
throughout their voyage. The total weight of the ballast is 2.27 LT. The distribution of
weight is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Ballast block arrangement.
The most di culty in the weight estimate came from the propulsion plant and outfitting
systems, because very little documentation existed on these systems. The pipe diameters
used for the crank shaft, rudder shaft, and rudder casing were measured from the model, and
assumed solid and constant along the entire length. The propulsion plant is a total of 0.45
LT of contributing weight and is presented in Figure 10. The outfitting system consists of
only components that have a recorded weight provided in [17]. The contributing weight is
0.11 LT, and is presented in Figure 11.
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Figure 10: Propulsion plant systems.
Figure 11: Outfitting systems.
The armament was set using a combination of historical resources and measured dimensions.
The spar consists of a three foot length of solid iron bar pipe and 13 foot hollow iron section
combined for a 16 foot overall length. The black powder charge geometry was estimated
as 132 lbs [5], and sized appropriately. The overall contribution to the weight was 0.09 LT
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with a variable weight of the black powder charge as 0.06 LT. Figure 6 presents the layout
of the armament. Because evidence was only found for a lower spar attachment, the weight
estimate does not include an upper spar or torpedo triggering mechanisms.
Finally the crew weight was provided from the volume calculation [17], and spaced accord-
ing to the location of handles along the crank shaft in Figure 10, with the captain sitting
directly below the forward hatch on a removable bench seat. The weights were applied as a
single point load, the contributing weight of the crew was 0.57 LT. The individual weight and
location of the crew can be found in Table 2, location presented in GHS coordinates found
in Figure 7.
Table 2: Distribution of crew weight
Title Mass (lbs) X (ft) Y (ft) Z (ft)
Dixon 157.50 29.25 -0.13 2.37
Becker 131.00 24.83 0.13 1.79
Lumpkin 157.50 22.83 0.13 1.79
Collins 171.50 20.83 0.13 1.79
Carlsen 159.00 18.83 0.13 1.79
Miller 151.50 16.83 0.13 1.79
Wicks 170.50 14.83 0.13 1.79
Ridgawat 170.00 12.83 0.13 1.79
Variable ballast tank weight was calculated as needed to trim the vessel. The forward and aft
ballast tanks were calculated in the GHS geometry file according to the tank configurations
in CAD model. The tanks are symmetrical, each with an internal volume of 31.3 cubic feet,
or 234 gallons. They are not covered on top, allowing flow between the tanks and the main
compartment. The forward and aft ballast tank bulkheads adjoining the main compartment
are approximately 3 feet 5 inches high. To be submerged, the calculated volume of water was
0.39 LT in the aft tank and 0.65 LT in the forward tank, which accounted for in the weight
estimate’s total mass.
Combining all of the ESWBS components gave the vessel a full load departure weight of
9.59 LT. The breakdown of the components can be found in Table 3.
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Table 3: ESWBS Weight Estimate - Breakdown as in proceeding sections
Group Title Mass (LT) X (ft) Y (ft) Z (ft)
1 Hull Structure 5.06 20.04 0.00 1.48
2 Propulsion Plant 0.45 11.20 0.09 1.88
3 Electrical Plant 0.00 00.00 0.00 0.00
4 Command 0.57 19.93 0.09 1.86
5 Auxiliary Systems 0.00 00.00 0.00 0.00
6 Outfitting Systems 0.11 19.50 0.12 1.77
7 Armament 0.09 52.82 0.00 0.00
M Margins 0.00 00.00 0.00 0.00
F Loads, Departure 3.31 21.12 -0.09 0.85
Total 9.59 20.28 -0.02 1.30
Having completed the weight estimate, some basic naval architecture calculations were ap-
plied to determine how the vessel will float under the current loading. Displaced volume was
calculated using the Orca3D extension in RhinoCAD. This gave a value of 9.89 LT as the
displacement. Comparing the weight from Table 3 to the displacement, there is a 3 percent
di↵erence. This could be due to unaccounted smaller structure, poor geometry estimation,
or poor water ballast estimation. Under this weight configuration, the draft was determined
to be 4.20 feet, with the water level just below the conning towers. This places the broken
pipe fitting about 19” underwater. The transverse metacentric height is 0.70 feet, and the
longitudinal metacentric height is 9.58 feet. These values are estimated while the vessel would
be sitting about the surface, acting similar to a traditional boat. Further stability analysis is
completed in Section 5.3. The conclusion of this estimation is that the vessel would be able
to float as expected at the predicted water ballast estimate, with enough margin to fill the
tanks and sink the vessel below the surface.
5.3 Stability Calculation
Stability analysis was completed for four di↵erent loading cases to determine how the ves-
sel responded under normal operation. The conditions considered are: Lightship, Pierside,
Personnel loading and mission profile.
5.3.1 Lightship Condition
For the lightship condition, the initial center of gravity was estimated using a weighted
average of the mass centers of gravity for each item in the SWBS applicable to the most
basic lightship loading condition. The lightship loading condition includes the weight of the
hull structure, propulsion and steering systems, and permanently mounted equipment such as
the ballast pumps, and keel ballast. It does not include the weight of armament, personnel,
nor the solid ballast blocks found inside the ballast tanks and main compartment. The
objective in assessing the hydrostatic properties of the Hunley in its lightship condition was
to verify that the designers and operators could lower the hull into the water prior to loading
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the vessel without capsizing or foundering. Table 4 presents the hydrostatic properties in the
lightship condition, while Figure 12 presents a visual of the vessels orientation.
Table 4: Lightship Hydrostatic Properties
Displacement
(LT)
Depth
(ft)
Trim
(deg+stern)
Heel
(deg+stbd)
GML
(ft)
GMT
(ft)
5.62 2.68 1.10 3.25 40.20 0.23
Figure 12: Lightship vessel orientation
5.3.2 Pierside Condition
The pier side loading condition includes all components considered immovable once Hunley
was in the water at the pier. It includes lightship weights with the addition of the spar
assembly, powder keg, and the 23 solid ballast blocks found in the ballast tanks and main
compartment individually weighing greater than 70 lbs. Table 5 presents the hydrostatic
properties in the pierside condition, Figure 13 presents the vessels orientation.
Table 5: Pierside Hydrostatic Properties
Displacement
(LT)
Depth
(ft)
Trim
(deg+stern)
Heel
(deg+stbd)
GML
(ft)
GMT
(ft)
7.11 3.84 0.61 -2.83 29.20 0.45
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Figure 13: Pierside vessel orientation
5.3.3 Personnel Loading Condition
The personnel loading condition consists of a series of 17 discrete steps simulating one possible
process for the crew to safely embark and load the remaining solid ballast blocks. The process
simulates the progressive addition of weight to the pier-side loading condition assuming the
crew embarked starting from the middle seats and alternating between the forward and aft
hatches. The process starts with the pier-side loading condition and simulates the progressive
addition of each member of the crew entering from alternating hatches along the centerline
of the vessel and shifting amidships and o↵-centerline to port to simulate each member of
the crew taking their final position at their assigned locations on the bench. In Figure 14,
odd numbers enter through the forward hatch, even through the aft hatch; Step A is entering
the vessel, step B is the final location in the vessel. The remaining solid ballast blocks were
the last weights added to complete the personnel loading condition. Note that in operation,
it is unlikely that the solid ballast blocks were re-loaded with each mission, once adjusted
they could be left in the vessel. Given their low VCG, they would only improve the stability
throughout the loading process from what was presented here. Interestingly, the locations
of the weights as they were discovered during excavation results in a very reasonable 1.26
degree trim by the stern and e↵ectively negligible 0.3 degree port heel. This suggests that
the weights did not likely shift considerably during Hunley’s attack or sinking. The e↵ect
of loading on the hydrostatic properties of the vessel at each step of the loading sequence is
graphically shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14: Hydrostatic property progression with personnel loading sequence
The final hydrostatic properties of the personnel loading condition is presented in Table 6.
The final vessel orientation after personnel loading is presented Figure 15.
Table 6: Final Personnel Loading Hydrostatic Properties
Displacement
(LT)
Depth
(ft)
Trim
(deg+stern)
Heel
(deg+stbd)
GML
(ft)
GMT
(ft)
8.56 3.86 1.26 -0.30 19.40 0.63
Figure 15: Final Personnel Loading vessel orientation
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5.3.4 Pre-Weapon Deployment Condition
The final conditions considered is the attack condition, which adds ballast water in the
forward and aft tanks to achieve submergence to the level described by the crew of the
Housatonic during the attack. Two feasible attack loading conditions that satisfy survivor
accounts were considered. The first condition consisted of filling the forward ballast tank
to 75 percent of its maximum capacity and the aft tank to 45 percent of its capacity. This
ballasting results in a condition where both conning towers and the snorkel box are completely
exposed above the waterline and the deck is awash. The pre-weapon deployment condition
with the deck being awash hydrostatics are presented in Table 7, Deck Awash pre-weapon
deployment hydrostatic properties, the vessel orientation is presented in Figure 16, Deck
awash pre-weapon deployment vessel orientation.
Table 7: Deck Awash pre-weapon deployment hydrostatic properties
Displacement
(LT)
Depth
(ft)
Trim
(deg+stern)
Heel
(deg+stbd)
GML
(ft)
GMT
(ft)
9.63 4.06 0.00 -0.24 07.20 0.70
Figure 16: Deck awash pre-weapon deployment vessel orientation
For the second attack condition, the ballasting was adjusted to fill the forward ballast tank
to 80 percent of its maximum capacity and the aft tank to 50 percent of its capacity. This
ballasting configuration results in the Hunley submerging to a point where the deck was fully
submerged and only the conning towers and snorkel box pierced the surface. The distinction
between these two pre-weapon deployment conditions is characterized by the di↵erence in
longitudinal sti↵ness due to changes in waterplane area. The deck awash pre-weapon deploy-
ment condition has the larger waterplane area, giving the vessel greater longitudinal sti↵ness
and consequently making the vessel less sensitive to trimming moments applied by longitudi-
nal weight shifts or fore and aft impulse loading, The deck submerged case is expected to be
more sensitive to ships of weight. The pre-weapon deployment with the deck submerged is
presented in Table 8, Deck submerged pre-weapon deployment hydrostatic properties. The
vessel orientation is presented in Figure 17, Deck submerged pre-weapon deployment vessel
orientation.
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Table 8: Deck submerged pre-weapon deployment hydrostatic properties
Displacement
(LT)
Depth
(ft)
Trim
(deg+stern)
Heel
(deg+stbd)
GML
(ft)
GMT
(ft)
9.72 4.42 0.23 -0.23 01.60 0.71
Figure 17: Deck submerged pre-weapon deployment vessel orientation
5.3.5 Post-Weapon Deployment Condition
After completing the analysis for both deck submerged and deck awash, the results reported
a drastic change in stability. The model demonstrates that after deploying the weapon,
the Hunley trims between 2.08 and 3.50 degrees by the stern. This response is due to
the significant loss of the forward trimming moment applied by the powder keg and the
resultant shift aft of the longitudinal center of buoyancy. The greater trim response of
the deck submerged attack condition due to the loss of the powder keg is caused by the
smaller longitudinal metacentric height. The results of post-weapon deployment are presented
in Table 9.
Table 9: Pre-weapon and post-weapon deployment comparison
Trim (deg+stern) GML (ft)
Deck Awash Pre-weapon 0.00 7.20
Deck Awash Post-weapon 2.08 3.60
Deck Submerged Pre-weapon 0.23 1.60
Deck Submerged Post-weapon 3.50 3.00
Analysis of the Hunleys general stability shows that overall, the vessels design allows for a
stable platform when operated on the surface. Once ballast water is added to submerge the
hull to the depths reported by the crew of the Housatonic; however, Hunley becomes very
sensitive to forward and aft weight shifts. This is a result of a loss in longitudinal sti↵ness
due to reduced water plane area. It is also important to note that our model predicts that
the Hunley could be fully submerged without fully filling its ballast tanks and that overfill-
ing either ballast tank results in unrestricted progressive flooding into the main compartment.
In post-weapons deployment condition, the Hunley maintains positive longitudinal and trans-
verse metacentric heights suggesting an ability to recover from heeling and pitching moments.
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Considering all operational loading conditions, the least stable condition characterized by
the smallest Transverse Metacentric Height is when the Hunley is in the deck awash: post-
weapons deployment condition. Even in this worst case condition, the Hunley maintains
positive righting energy through a 90 degree roll as shown in Figure 18.
Figure 18: Deck awash post-weapon deployment righting arm curve
5.3.6 Stability Discussion
The Hunley’s greatest vulnerability in its pre-weapon and post-weapon deployment condi-
tions is the significantly reduced weight-per-inch submergence property. Due to small free-
board and similarly low reserve buoyancy, the Hunley is extremely sensitive to added mass
specifically added mass due to flooding or additional ballasting. In particular, after deploy-
ing the powder keg and taking on a trim by the stern, the model shows that the Hunley
sinks after taking on approximately 50 gallons of seawater into any compartment in the deck
submerged: post-weapons deployment condition. Similarly, in deck awash: post-weapons
deployment condition the Hunley sinks after the addition of approximately 74 gallons of sea-
water into any compartment.
The results of our analysis highlight the danger of any uncontrolled rapid flooding due to
crew actions or damage inflicted during the attack and its aftermath. It is also important
to note that, due to reduced longitudinal sti↵ness in the Post-Weapons Deployment Con-
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ditions, any small amount of flooding also results in rapid and unrecoverable changes in
trim. Since weapons deployment results in an immediate trim by the stern, any flooding or
added ballast in the main compartment or aft ballast tank immediately exasperates that trim.
This analysis was strictly static to understand stability and required volume of water nec-
essary to cause complete submergence of the vessel. It does not include dynamics from the
exploding torpedo, dynamic rotation or flooding of the vessel. However, in terms of scenario
6, it appears that overall the vessel would be reasonably stable in the attack configuration
unless new water is introduced to the vessel from the outside.
5.4 Resistance and Powering Calculation
5.4.1 Empirical Model
To better understand if the submarine was underpowered, the resistance of the hull was
calculated, then matched to the power output of the propeller. This methodology was taken
from Introduction to Naval Architecture [6] on submarines and relies on regression data and
approximate relationships for both the submarine drag and propeller e ciency. The values
required to complete these calculations can be found in Table 10 below.
Table 10: Submarine resistance characteristics
Symbol Characteristic Value
L submarine length 40 ft
D submarine diameter 3.75 ft
S wetted surface area 612ft2
Sappend appendage surface area 140ft2
g gravity 32.174ft/s2
⇢ sea water density 1.936slugs/ft3
⌫ viscosity 1.217 ⇤ 10 5ft2/s
These values were found by measuring the components from the geometry model, assuming
the vessel was sailing with the deck just barely submerged. This model, designed for modern
submarines, assumes a perfectly cylindrical submarine. In this case, an equivalent diameter
of the submarine was calculated by averaging the height and width of the submarine. The
appendage wetted area was calculated from the geometry model and consists of the rudder,
propeller and duct, dive planes, and keel block. The ratio of appendage surface area to the
hull surface area is approximately 20 percent.
The coe cient of friction was calculated using the velocity Reynolds number, Equation (1),
and the ITTC 1957 approximation found in Equation (2).
Rn =
V L
⌫
(1)
CF =
0.075
(log(Rn)  2)2 (2)
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The viscosity coe cient was calculated using an approximation for a submarine bare hull cal-
culation [6] found in Equation (3). This equation is only an approximation and ignores wave
drag. Friction forces were estimated by the ITTC 1957 friction line because the Reynolds
numbers were above 105, generally following a method similar to larger submarine resistance
estimation [6]. The appendage viscosity coe cient was estimated as 1.8 times the hull viscos-
ity coe cient found in Equation (4). Because the surface of the Hunley may be rougher than
modern submarines, the overall vessel is less slender than larger submarines, and the Hunley
has higher appendage drag, the Hunley is not a perfect fit with the submarines used to de-
velop this model. Thus, the model calculations must be viewed as an initial approximation
of resistance.
CV = CF
 
1 + 0.5
✓
D
L
◆
+ 3
✓
D
L
◆3!
(3)
CV append = 1.8CV (4)
The total resistance calculation uses a combination of the coe cients by the respective wetted
area [6], and can be found in Equation (5).
RT = 0.5⇢V
2 ((Cv + Ca)S + CV appendSappend) (5)
The value of Ca was approximated as 0.0001, all other values can be found in Table 10.
Using this process, the total resistance was found for speeds varying between 0.5 and 4
knots, which is the range of recorded velocities from historical resources. The required power
was calculated using Equation (6).
EHP =
RTV
550
(6)
where 550 is the conversion factor to yield power units of Horse Power (HP). Calculating the
resistance was the first step to the propeller-hull matching. The next step is to look at the
power output of the propeller.
A thrust calculation was completed with open water characteristics to create a power-velocity
curve. The geometry was developed from a best fit curve from the laser scan data. The ge-
ometry used is presented in Figure 19, with the characteristics presented in Table 11. At the
time of this work, the propeller was still covered in concretion, thus this geometry must be
viewed as approximate. The propeller has since been cleaned, and an updated calculation
with the actually propeller geometry could help significantly.
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Figure 19: Propeller geometry used for thrust calculations.
Table 11: Propeller characteristics
Symbol characteristic Value
D Diameter 31.63 in
P/D Pitch to Diameter ratio 0.776
EAR Expanded Area Ratio 0.2876
w wake factor 0.1
t thrust deduction 0.1
gear ratio 1.285
depth of shaft 24 in
Using the values above, the propeller was approximated as a Wageningen B Series propeller.
The B Series approach represents a more modern propeller and is again an initial rough esti-
mate. However, in the absence of propeller section shape data from a de-concreted propeller,
it is a reasonable starting point. A Matlab script was used to develop the thrust and torque
coe cients for the propeller. This program used a polynomial fit for the required coe cients
based on experimentally tested propellers parameterized by the propeller geometry. The
thrust coe cient, torque coe cient, and open water e ciency for various forward speeds are
presented in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Propeller characteristic curve.
The independent variable was determined to be the rotational speed of the crank. Crankshaft
RPM was varied between 5 and 100 RPM, based on the perceived rate at which a human
could turn the shaft. This was converted to a propeller RPM using the gear ratio, which was
estimated at 1.28 based on the outline of the still-concreted gears. A propeller-hull matching
calculation was completed to determine how the vessel would operate under these various
rotational speeds. The goal of this analysis was to determine if the limiting factor would be
the speed the vessel could travel or sustainable human rotational speed. Because the best case
scenario is desired for forward velocity, hull e ciency ⌘H and rotational e ciency ⌘R were
estimated at values of 1. The steps used are based on the Principles of Naval Architecture
(PNA) standard [10]. Usable torque and thrust values were calculated using Equation (7)
and Equation (8).
Q0 = KQ0⇢n
2D5 (7)
T0 = KT⇢n
2D4 (8)
KQ0 is the coe cient of torque, KT is the coe cient of thrust developed from the Matlab
script, n is propeller revolution in rev/s, and ⇢ is the density value from Table 10.
To find the correct delivered power, the behind hull e ciency was calculated using Equa-
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tion (9).
⌘B = ⌘R⌘0 =
Q0
Q
(9)
⌘0 was selected based on the rotation rate of the propeller. The usable thrust was calculated
based on Equation (10), then converted to power using Equation (11).
T =
⌘B2⇡nQ
VA
(10)
PT = ⌘HTVA (11)
Completing these calculations, the human RPM was varied from 5 to 100 RPM, the forward
velocity was calculated based on matching the required power to the power produced by
the crew at that RPM. These values were determined to be close enough if the thrust was
within five percent over the resistance of the hull. This could be further improved with
more refinement in the propeller curve. The results of the propeller matching are presented
in Figure 21.
Figure 21: Power required over velocity curve
In the figure, the Hunley will move along the thrust power curve until it reaches either the
seven person or five person limit. These lines represent the limiting horse power output of
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each person, assuming 0.067 HP per person. The horse power per person was calculated
using the maximum force output per person [1] in a cranking position converted into power
output. The five person case represents the potential of vessel damage, and two people
would be working the hand pumps to empty the main compartment. The limiting factor is
the 5 person case at approximately 3.01 knots. In the seven person case, extrapolation of
the curve suggests that the vessel will move only slightly faster at a sprint speed of 3.25 knots.
An RPM to velocity comparison graph was developed to see the maximum speed that would
be obtainable under di↵erent assumed crankshaft rotation rates. The results are presented
in Figure 22.
Figure 22: Velocity over RPM graph with RPM bounds
It is observed that to achieve the necessary thrust power for the five person case discussed
above, the crew would have to crank at about 90 RPM. To move at 3.25 knots for the seven
person case, the rotation rate would be greater than 90 RPM. A more reasonable sustained
rate is believed to be around 30 RPM, which would propel the Hunley forward at one knot.
From this analysis, the long-term sustainable speed of the Hunley is probably closer to one
knot than three knots. The RPM requirement confirms several aspects of the historical
record. It appears that the Hunley would be capable of moving roughly three to four knots
in a short sprint, but that speed is not sustainable for a long period. A sustained speed
2017-001 33
Final Report: Investigation into the Loss of the H.L. Hunley
ONR Grants # N00014-14-1-0179, N00014-15-1-2031
closer to one knot would tie in with Alexander’s and McClintock’s concerns about the vessel
not being able to fight the tidal current. The inability to fight the tide indicates that the
Hunley may not have immediately attempted to return to shore after the attack until the
tidal current had begun to switch from ebb to flood.
5.4.2 Experimental Model
Given the relative importance of the powering of the vessel to the vessel’s operation, the
author’s prioritized removing the uncertainty in the approximate powering estimates above.
A Master’s Thesis undertaken by author Dan Burke [4] built a 13 scale hydrodynamic replica
of the vessel. The model was tested in six conditions during the summer of 2016, as listed
in Table 12. Given the large area and unclear operating angle of the dive planes (fins) on the
hull, the model was developed so that it could be tested with or without fins.
Table 12: Resistance test condition characteristics
Case Description Draft - vessel, ft Draft - model, ft2
A Model Lightship, with fins 3.67 1.22
B Model Lightship, without fins 3.67 1.22
C Deck awash, with fins 4.17 1.39
D Deck awash, without fins 4.17 1.39
E Fully submerged, with fins 5.5 1.83
F Fully submerged, without fins 5.5 1.83
Each condition was tested between 1.0 and 4.0 knots full-scale speed in increments of 0.5
knots, in calm water. The fins on the model had a total surface area of 31.3ft2 full scale
and were set at a 0-degree angle of attack. This angle is not expected to be exactly aligned
with the flow at all velocities, so both surface friction drag and shape drag from the fins
will be present. The model was fixed in both sinkage and trim during the testing. Given
the large area of the fins, it is likely that the crew could dynamically impact the trim of the
vessel at higher forward speeds by moving the fin position. However, in the current study,
this impact was not quantified as neither the fins nor the towing apparatus was configured
to measure vertical forces or moments. Additionally, the fully submerged condition was not
deep enough to prevent surface waves from being formed in the tank at the higher speeds.
At deeper submergences, this drag term would disappear. The geometric parameters of the
model are shown in Table 13.
After test data was post-processed, the resistance values were expanded from model scale to
full scale using the ITTC 1957 approach. The expanded, full-scale resistance of each config-
uration is plotted in Figure 23, comparing the resistance of the submarine at each draft with
and without fins. The experimentally-measured points are shown with circle markers, and a
quadratic best fit regression line is also plotted. Over the speed range of 1 to 4.5 knots full
scale, the quadratic regression is a good fit of the resistance for all drafts. Additionally, the
relative importance of the fins decreases as the vessel sinks deeper into the water. At lighter
drafts, the resistance of the vessel is dramatically reduced — roughly cut in half at three
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Table 13: Resistance model characteristics
Parameter Full scale Model scale
Overall Length, ft 40.2 13.4
Moulded Depth, ft 4.15 1.38
Depth Overall, ft 5.7 1.90
Beam, ft 3.575 1.19
Surface Area - Cond. A, ft2 401.9 44.7
Surface Area - Cond. B, ft2 370.7 41.2
Surface Area - Cond. C, ft2 483.2 53.7
Surface Area - Cond. D, ft2 451.9 50.2
Surface Area - Cond. E, ft2 505.0 56.1
Surface Area - Cond. F, ft2 473.7 52.6
knots between decks awash and fully submerged.
Images of the model being tested at all three drafts are shown in Figure 24. At 3 knots, the
model shows a significant but reasonably gentle Kelvin wave pattern in each case. The fins
seem to only make a small disturbance to the free-surface flow. However, in the fully sub-
merged case, the round conning tower/hatches have significant separated flow around each
of them, adding to drag. The snorkel box, although partially shielded by the forward hatch
also adds to the drag. This poorer flow, coupled with the increase in surface area exposed to
friction drag, most likely explains the large increase in measured resistance.
To further understand the resistance characteristics of each model, the total model drag was
separated into the components used in the 1957 ITTC resistance scaling procedure: frictional
surface drag and residuary resistance. For the submarine in this test, the residuary resistance
will include wave making drag as well as flow separation and form drag from the hullform as
a 1+k approach similar to the 1978 ITTC was not taken. The percentage of total drag at-
tributable to frictional surface drag is shown in Figure 25. For the slower speeds, the relative
contribution of skin friction is higher as expected. The low value of friction for the initial
point tested in Case D is believed to be a measurement issue, the total drag at this speed is
only on the order of 1 Newton for the model. However, even at three knots, in any of the
surfaced conditions, frictional drag contributes more than 50% to the total drag. At lower
speeds, the contribution ranges from 60% to 90%.
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(a) Resistance Curves for Cases A and B
(b) Resistance Curves for Cases C and D
(c) Resistance Curves for Cases E and F
Figure 23: Resistance Curves and Quadratic Fit over Range 1-4 kts
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(a) Cases A and B, Model at Rest (b) Cases A and B, Model at 3.0 kts
(c) Cases C and D, Model at Rest (d) Cases C and D, Model at 3.0 kts
(e) Cases E and F, Model at Rest (f) Cases E and F, Model at 3.0 kts
Figure 24: Images of Resistance Tests Configuration in Calm Water and at 3 knots
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(a) Resistance Fractions for Cases A and B
(b) Resistance Fractions for Cases C and D
(c) Resistance Fractions for Cases E and F
Figure 25: Resistance Components for Cases A-F
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As surface friction is the largest component of drag in these conditions, the accuracy of the
friction estimate is critical to the overall accuracy of the resistance prediction in the one to
three knot region. Surface friction is primarily influenced by the flow’s Reynolds number and
the surface roughness. While the Reynold’s number can be estimated with good accuracy,
the surface roughness of the H.L. Hunley is relatively unknown. The surface roughness of
the ITTC 1957 friction line corresponds to more modern, and typically larger vessels. If the
surface roughness of the H.L. Hunley was much rougher, both the friction drag and total
drag will increase. The surface roughness of the Hunley would be impacted by both the
larger features — rivets, straps etc. — as well as the as-produced finish of the hull plates.
Additionally, the H.L. Hunley spent most of it career in warm, southern ports. The amount
of biofouling present on the vessel is di cult to estimate, but biofouling would also increase
the e↵ective hull roughness. The Chapman picture of the vessel on the wharf does not show
extensive fouling, though it is possible that any fouling was cleaned o↵ during the repairs
made after the second sinking. In interpreting the model test results for the surfaced con-
ditions, especially at the lower speed ranges, the uncertainty in friction drag must be kept
in mind. The fully submerged model test results show a lower sensitivity to hull roughness
elements, but changes in hull roughness could impact these drag values as well.
The model test data was compared to the empirical drag estimate developed previously. The
empirical approach does not match any of the testing conditions exactly - the wetted sur-
face and draft is closest to conditions C and D. However, surface wave drag and separated
flow around the conning towers that was observed in the experiment are not included in
the empirical formula. Additionally, the empirical formula is based on 100 additional years
of naval architectural improvements, and assumes smoother, more hydrodynamic shapes for
appendages and the pressure hull. Overall, the best comparison is probably condition C for
the empirical formula, however, conditions A and E were also included in the comparison.
The results are shown in Figure 26, with quite strong agreement seen between condition C
and the empirical equation. Based on these results, the earlier conclusions from the empirical
model alone are confirmed. With the vessel low in the water, a sprint speed near 3.0 knots
and a sustained speed between 1.0 and 1.5 knots is reasonable.
There are two major sources of uncertainty that still impact this estimate. The first is hull
roughness and fouling. As discussed above, the empirical equation also uses more mod-
ern surface roughness values, so the good agreement between the experiment and empirical
equation gives no additional confidence in the roughness estimate. It is still possible that a
heavily-fouled H.L. Hunley would be slower than the calculations presented in this report.
Secondly, the propeller estimate is also rough - only an approximate outline of the still-
concreted propeller was used to estimate the propeller performance. When a more accurate
scan of the propeller surface is available, a modern lifting-line approach could be taken to
update the propeller e ciency and RPM values.
5.5 Sheared Pipe Analysis
Scenarios three and five from Section 4 consider the role the sheared ballast fill pipe might
have played in the loss of the vessel. During conservation of the vessel, archaeologists discov-
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Table 14: Resistance Test Results by Case
Full scale drag, Lbf, for each case
V, kts V, Fn A B C D E F Equation (5)
1 0.047 4.3 4.3 6.1 7.6 5.2 5.8 8.2
1.5 0.07 10.6 9.0 13.0 10.3 24.1 21.1 17.2
2 0.094 16.9 15.3 21.4 18.9 44.1 42.7 29.0
2.5 0.118 27.0 23.2 35.3 29.4 69.7 66.3 43.7
3 0.141 41.4 33.0 54.2 48.1 109.3 105.4 61.1
3.5 0.164 57.3 43.6 76.0 67.0 145.2 135.6 81.1
4 0.188 78.2 60.7 94.4 80.3 203.0 181.0 103.7
4.5 0.212 103.0 83.6 119.8 100.9 251.8 227.5 128.9
ered that the forward ballast tank fill pipe had fractured where it meets the submarine’s outer
hull (Figure 27). This fracture would allow seawater to directly enter the crew compartment,
roughly below the forward conning tower. The stability results show that only 50-75 gallons
of flooding water are necessary to sink the vessel when the vessel is floating with the deck
awash. Thus, if the ballast pipe sheared o↵ as a result of the weapon firing, it is possible
that the vessel foundered owing to the water that would be let in. However, it is not clear
how long it would take for such damage to sink the vessel. Thus, understanding the flow
rate through the sheared pipe is critical. This work was done in three phases. First, a simple
model was built to get a rough estimate of the time to sink through the flooded connection.
Then, detailed CFD and a model experiment were used to validate this finding.
Figure 26: Comparison of Estimated and Measured Drag
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5.5.1 Simple Bernoulli Model
The first step was to complete a rapid model using basic Bernoulli equations to obtain a rough
estimate of the flooding time. The hole geometry is an irregular shape due to the sheared
pipe blocking a portion of the circular opening. The geometry was developed in AutoCAD
using the image shown in Figure 27 and known dimensions. The opening of the hole was
traced in AutoCAD using two circles which were then scaled to the proper dimensions. The
diameter of the hole in the outer hull is 1.54 inches, and the thickness of the pipe is 0.314
inches; It was assumed that the interior diameter of the pipe is the same size as the hole.
AutoCAD was used to calculate the area of the hole which came to be 1.016 square inches.
This opening area was used in the initial model to calculate the volumetric flow rate.
Figure 27: Geometry of sheared pipe opening
A theoretical model assuming a potential flow within the system was initially used to calculate
the flow through the hole. For this initial model, Bernoulli’s equation was used along a stream
line from the surface to the outlet of the hole and is shown in Equation (12). This model
assumes incompressible, laminar, inviscid, and irrotational flow. Since water is the fluid
being analyzed the assumption of incompressible is valid; the assumptions of irrotational and
laminar cannot be assumed to be particularly applicable to this system and this is noted
when assessing the validity of the results. For the system, inviscid e↵ects are significant,
requiring additional analysis past this theoretical model. The inviscid results of this model
provide an upper bound of the flow rate for comparison and to validate the CFD results and
refined model.
Pa + 0.5⇢V
2
a + ⇢gha = Pb + 0.5⇢V
2
b + ⇢ghb (12)
It is assumed that the velocity at the ocean’s surface due to the flow through the hole is zero
and the equation can be simplified to solve for the velocity at the outlet assuming the pressure
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and height di↵erence between points A and B ( h) is known. This simplified equation is
shown in Equation (13).
Vb =
s
2
✓
 P
⇢
+ ⇢g h
◆
(13)
At the assumed loading condition of the Hunley, the hole is located 1.64 feet below the
surface and it is assumed that the Hunley remains at this depth for the time period being
investigated; this makes the height di↵erence term constant making the pressure di↵erence
the only changing value to a↵ect the flow rate through the hole for this model.
The pressure at point A was assumed to be constant at atmospheric pressure. The pressure
at point B, the outlet, was initially assumed to be at atmospheric pressure, but increase as
water flows into the hull. The initial volume of air in the submarine was calculated to be
2518 gallons in [9]. The internal pressure was calculated for each iteration using the following
equation using the pressure (P ) and volume of air (8). The volume of air was calculated by
subtracting the volume of water in the submarine from the initial volume of air.
Pi8i = Pi+18i+1 (14)
This is likely a conservative assumption, as the vessel may not have been airtight at the
time of the sinking. It is unclear when the hole in the forward hatch tower occurred, but if
this occurred during the attack, the vessel would be open to the atmosphere, and the initial
flooding rate would be maintained throughout the sinking process. It is also possible that
the vessel was not made completely air-tight by the crew, as they may have had no intention
of fully submerging the vessel and would have been more concerned with ease of exchanging
the air for breathability.
From the stability analysis, it was found that the Hunley will sink after taking on 50-74
gallons of seawater. (Note that the vessel may also be able to dive dynamically by using the
dive planes to exert a downward force with su cient forward speed even if the vessel is net
buoyant. The maneuverability of the vessel has not yet been investigated). To explore the
entire critical time period and to be conservative, the system was analyzed until 75 gallons
had flowed into the submarine through the hole.
A convergence study was conducted for the initial model. For this study, the time step was
altered until the solution was no longer dependent on the time step used. The volume of
water that flows through the hole during a specified time period, 140 seconds, was used as
the solution for comparison. An initial time step of 2.0 seconds was used and it was found
that the model converged with a time step of 0.01 seconds; a time step of 0.005 seconds was
used to solve the model. The convergence of the model is shown below in Figure 28.
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Figure 28: Convergence of Bernoulli Model
In the Bernoulli model, it took 170.5 seconds for 75 gallons to flow into the Hunley. The initial
pressure di↵erence was 105.00 pounds per square foot and resulted in an initial volumetric
flow rate of 0.5425 gallons per second. When 75 gallons had flowed into the Hunley the
pressure di↵erence reduced to 40.05 pounds per square foot and the volumetric flow rate
slowed to 0.3351 gallons per second. The relationship between the flow rate and pressure
di↵erence is shown in Figure 29. This flooding time is understood to be a preliminary estimate
but is not inconsistent with the battlefield geometry. It is clear that whatever sunk the vessel
was not immediately catastrophic as the vessel was able to move about 1,000 feet from the
Housatonic. It is also possible that the pipe broke later for reasons unrelated to the attack,
such as a crew member striking it, especially if the attack damaged, but did not fracture the
connection. However, such a scenario is di cult to investigate, at least until more complete
examination of the pipe has been made. Thus, further examination of the flow through this
break was conducted so that a more accurate time estimate could be made.
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Figure 29: Relationship between Volumetric Flow Rate and Pressure Di↵erence for Bernoulli
Model
5.5.2 CFD Model
The irregular shape of the opening means that the simple model used above is unlikely to
be accurate. A CFD analysis was conducted to try to determine the flow through the actual
dimensions of the break. A static CFD analysis was solved at several pressure di↵erences
to determine a relationship between the pressure di↵erence and the flow rate through the
hole. Ten di↵erent pressure di↵erences, ranging from 11.3 to 105.3 lbf/ft2, were used in the
static model to calculate the resulting flow rate. These results were fitted with a fifth order
regression model to describe the relationship between the pressure di↵erence across the hole
and the resulting flow rate.
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Figure 30: Grid Used for CFD Analysis
The geometry used for the CFD analysis is a horizontal cylinder with one end matching the
geometry of the hull around the hole. The mesh geometry is shown in Figure 30; the top half
of the cylinder and inner domains are not shown in the figure. The outer hull of the Hunley
is on the right and the crescent-shaped hole is displayed in green. The mesh size is described
in Table 15. The unstructured grid was generated using Pointwise, and T-Rex cells were used
around the opening of the hole to capture viscous e↵ects; cells were also concentrated around
the opening for a better analysis. The T-Rex cells have an initial height of 0.001 inches, and
there are 10 layers with a growth rate of 1.3.
Table 15: CFD Grid Properties
Cells 156,702
Faces 318,524
Nodes 28,682
The cylinder creating the outer boundary has a diameter and length of two feet. This makes
the radial distance to the side of the cylinder from the opening approximately eight times the
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diameter of the hole and the distance to the inlet from the hole to be approximately sixteen
times the diameter of the hole; these distances are su cient to avoid any grid boundary
e↵ects on the flow.
The CFD analysis was solved using Ansys Fluent. A pressure based solver with a viscous
laminar model was used to solve for the solution. The model was solved as a steady state
model with ten di↵erent cases. The boundary conditions of the model were chosen to most
accurately describe the system. The outer hull of the Hunley was set to be a wall boundary.
The opening of the hole was set as a pressure outlet. The opposite end of the cylinder
and the sides of the cylinder were set as pressure inlets. The pressure inlets were set to
the operating pressure, and the pressure outlet pressure was varied to create the required
pressure di↵erential. The internal pressures were chosen to cover the entire expected range
of the internal pressures for the system. Table 16 shows the exterior and interior pressures
and the pressure di↵erence for each case.
Table 16: Pressures used for CFD model
Case External Internal Pressure
Pressure Pressure Di↵erence
(lbf/ft2) (lbf/ft2) (lbf/ft2)
1 2221 2115.7 105.3
2 2221 2126.1 94.9
3 2221 2136.6 84.4
4 2221 2147.0 74.0
5 2221 2157.5 63.5
6 2221 2167.9 53.1
7 2221 2178.4 42.6
8 2221 2188.8 32.2
9 2221 2199.2 21.8
10 2221 2209.7 11.3
A convergence study was conducted to ensure that the grid for the model was fine enough.
The cell size on the face of the outlet and the T-Rex cells were reduced in size until the
solution was no longer grid dependent. The flow rate calculated for each case was recorded
and through a regression analysis a fifth order model was found to adequately describe the
relationship. The volumetric flow rate (8˙w) in cubic feet per second is calculated using Equa-
tion (15) where dp is the pressure di↵erence.
8˙w =((8.66 ⇤ 10 4) ⇤ dp)  ((1.4 ⇤ 10 6) ⇤ dp2)
+ ((1.83 ⇤ 10 7) ⇤ dp3)  ((1.3 ⇤ 10 9) ⇤ dp4)
+ ((3.59 ⇤ 10 12) ⇤ dp5) + 0.006128
(15)
A comparison of the calculated values from the CFD model and the regression model is shown
below in Figure 31. The R2 value for the correlation is 0.999997. Over the expected range
of pressure di↵erences this model accurately represents the results of the CFD analysis.
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Figure 31: Volumetric Flow Rate from Equation and CFD Analysis
The flooding simulation was re-run, with the flow rate calculated via Equation (15) instead
of Bernoulli’s equation. This model considers the viscous e↵ects and no longer assumes ir-
rotational flow. This simulation continues with the assumption that the Hunley remains at
a constant depth with the hole located 1.64 feet below the surface. This simulation also
uses the same algorithm to calculate the interior pressure. Similar to the Bernoulli-based
simulation, this simulation was used to calculate the flow through the hole until 75 gallons
has flowed into the Hunley.
The CFD-base simulation calculated that it took 283.9 second for 75 gallons to flow into
the Hunley. The initial pressure di↵erence was 105.00 pounds per square foot and resulted
in an initial volumetric flow rate of 0.317 gallons per second. When 75 gallons had flowed
into the Hunley the pressure di↵erence reduced to 40.05 pounds per square foot and the
volumetric flow rate slowed to 0.203 gallons per second. The relationship between the flow
rate and pressure di↵erence is shown in Figure 32. As the submarine sinks below the free
surface, the pressure will rise quickly, roughly 64 pound per square foot per foot of additional
submergence. At the seafloor, the flowrate would be much higher than with the vessel running
in the decks awash position, even at the relatively shallow depths where the attack took place.
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Figure 32: Relationship between Volumetric Flow Rate and Pressure Di↵erence for Refined
Model
Thus, the CFD model predicts a much slower flow rate than the simple Bernoulli model,
taking over four and half minutes for the vessel to sink. However, the time frame remains
consistent with the battlefield geometry - even if the vessel su↵ered the sheared ballast pipe
during the attack, the vessel would remain on the surface for several minutes, giving it time to
get away from the U.S.S. Housatonic. However, the CFD model also contains approximations
compared to the real-world pipe geometry. Most significantly, the opening is considered a
simple orifice, with no flow restrictions from the pipe inside the hole, and no interaction
between the open pipe ending and the flow. Including these details in the CFD model would
have required extensive development and validation. Given the small size of the failure,
experimental confirmation was judged a more e↵ective approach.
5.6 Experimental Results
To validate the CFD model and time to sink estimates, a full-scale mock up of the broken
ballast pipe, hull surface, and hull opening were created and experimentally tested. The
geometry of the fracture was modeled and then created via additive manufacturing in ABS
plastic. An image of the geometry is shown below in Figure 33. A section of the hull geom-
etry, capturing the curvature of the hull near the through-hull termination of the ballast fill
line was modeled. Based on measurements and photographs of the broken pipe, the through-
hull opening and o↵set, and inner fill pipe were included in the model. Additionally, the
ballast fill line that had broken o↵ was modeled back the location of the seacock valve in the
fill line. This valve was in the closed position when the vessel was recovered, the closed valve
was simulated by printing a solid end to the pipe. The pipe was printed hollow, with the
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same wall thickness observed on the vessel, to capture and flow patterns involving the open
end of the pipe. The model was also surrounded by a simple square box for mounting in a
pressure chamber.
Figure 33: 3-D Printed Pipe Geometry and Failed Connection
A variable-pressure water chamber was built to test the pipe break. The chamber consisted of
a large pressure vessel that could be partially filled with water. The pressure in the air above
the water could be modified via a control system to simulate di↵erent external pressures.
With this configuration, the flowrate at di↵erent external pressures could be determined. A
schematic of the arrangement and pipe specimen mounted in the chamber is shown in Fig-
ure 34.
The results from the experimental analysis are shown in comparison with the other two
methods in Figure 35. The experimental results fall between the other two methods, but
generally closer to the CFD results. There is a slight discontinuity in the experimental results
at the point when the air pressurization systems was initially engaged at 100 lbfft2 , otherwise
the plots all follow the same shape. The results indicate that the timings calculated by the
CFD results are an upper bound for the estimated time to sink as:
• The CFD results have the lowest flowrate
• The CFD results assume an air-tight hull, with pressure build up. Battle damage (the
grapefruit-size hole discussed in Scenario 2 in Table 1), or lack of attention to making
the vessel airtight would result in no pressure build up and a faster flooding rate.
2017-001 49
Final Report: Investigation into the Loss of the H.L. Hunley
ONR Grants # N00014-14-1-0179, N00014-15-1-2031
Figure 34: Pipe Model Test Schematic and Setup
• If the forward conning tower damage occurred during the attack, when this part of the
vessel submerged, the flooding rate would further increase.
Figure 35: Experimental Flow Results Compared to Simple Model and CFD Model
Knowing the maximum time to sink of 4 minutes and 44 seconds is valuable. Combining this
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distance with the battlefield geometry allows a required speed to be calculated. To cover the
1000 feet that the vessel moved from the Housatonic in 4 minutes 44 seconds requires an
average speed of 2.07 knots. While the vessel would have to fall through the water column to
reach the seabed, the shallow depth in this area of the coast means that the vertical distance
to fall is only on the order of 20 feet. Given that the vessel’s fore and aft balance would
already be upset by the loss of the charge, it is unlikely the vessel maintained an even keel
line while sinking, further reducing the distance necessary to sink before the vessel hits the
seafloor. An uneven keel at impact is further supported by the broken rudder observed at the
wreck site, suggesting the vessel may have hit stern first. Thus, the time falling the vertical
distance to the seafloor is not thought to add significantly to the overall time.
5.7 Drift Forces
Knowing the time it takes for the submarine to sink, the question turns to how the Hunley
covered this distance. To analyze options for the vessel’s movement, information was found
about the sea state to determine if the current would be able to move the Hunley a significant
distance without the crew contributing. Such an unpowered drift would be necessary if the
crew members were disabled by their vessel’s weapon.
From the NPS report, some background is provided about the metocean data along the
South Carolina shoreline. The tidal forces and currents are the predominant acting forces
along the South Carolina shore line in this time frame [12]. The tidal range is five and a
half feet with a maximum of eight feet. At the lower tidal ranges, we would expect to see
predominately wave forces. The currents are alongshore currents, varying in velocity and
direction heading southward, developed from the waves hitting the shore. The annual wave
data suggests a significant wave height of 4 feet with a period of five seconds. The wind act-
ing along the coast is seasonal. South and southwest winds can be found during the summer
with an annual average of 12.5 knots found o↵shore. It is expected that the waves would
follow the same approximate seasonal trends [12].
A significant wave height of 4 feet would be dangerous to the submarine and perhaps prove
that flooding through the forward hatch would be an option. However, because all personal
accounts state that the particular night of the attack was calm, and the records are from an
averaged set of values, it is safe to eliminate flooding through the forward hatch as an option
for the sake of discussion in this paper.
To learn more about the potential for current-powered drift, National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) was contacted to obtain tidal variation and current data
from the Fort Sumter region to be able and verify accounts that the Hunley left around high
tide. Some di↵erence in tide timings is likely between the Hunley site and the Fort, owing to
the harbor location of the latter, however, tide data was not available at the attack location.
The results are presented in Figure 36.
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Figure 36: Current Velocity over February 17, 1864
The current data was only available at a few discrete points. A smooth curve fit to the
current data was created to simulate the vessel’s drift. The fit uses the crossing between
4:40 pm and 11:21 pm as anchors. The curve’s o↵set and amplitude were selected to fit a
maximum current of 1.4 knots away from Fort Sumter. This fitting strategy is su cient
because the time of interest is between 7:00 pm and 11:00 pm, so the fit is not as critical for
the first half of the data. The fit equation is found in Equation (16), where the equation is
in seconds from midnight on February 17th, and velocity is in knots.
vCurrent = 1.2 ⇤ sin
✓
2⇡
44400
⇤ t+ 240
◆
  0.2 (16)
Using this data, the first thing to verify is the assertion that the Hunley was able to leave
around 7:00 pm and ride the tide to the attack site. Ebb tide at Fort Sumter is 4:11 pm,
reaching full speed at 8:01 pm. This timing verifies that the current would have been at the
crews back on the way to the attack site, and would continue until around 11:21 pm. After
the attack however, the crew would have to wait for 2 hours 30 minutes before flood tide
to ride the current back to shore; otherwise, they would have to fight the ebb tide traveling
between zero and one knots. The propulsion study presented previously indicates that the
vessel’s maximum sustained speed is probably on the order of one knot. Thus it is quite likely
that the vessel would plan to wait until almost slack water before starting the journey to shore.
The next area of interest is to determine how far the vessel is able to drift under the forcing
of the current alone. If all the crew members were disabled by the blast of their own weapon
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and the ballast pipe sheared, the vessel would need to travel the 1000 feet to the vessel’s
final resting location in less than 5 minutes by current alone. Assuming the Hunley has
instantaneous acceleration after the attack into the current, two simulations were run to see
how far the vessel would drift. The first calculation used a linear fit between the NOAA
data points, and the second used the sinusoidal curve fit from Equation (16). The results
are presented in Figure 37. The drift distance is measured from the point of attack at the
Housatonic, while the time is measured in seconds from the attack, assumed to be at 8:58
pm. There is a small di↵erence between the tidal current models which increases as time
increases, about 70 seconds of di↵erence at 1000 feet.
Figure 37: Drift distance calculated with the current velocity over time
Section 3.4 suggests that the required travel distance is 1000 feet based on relative location of
the Housatonic and the Hunley wrecks. Figure 37 shows that it would take about 13 minutes
of drifting to cover this distance, which is beyond the 4 minutes 44 seconds that were found
in Section 5.5. This timing makes it unlikely the pipe failure at the time of the attack and a
completely disabled crew would lead to the battlefield geometry that was observed. Several
other explanations could fit some of these facts, but at the moment none of them are fully
consistent with what was observed:
• It is possible the crew had the Hunley much higher in the water than assumed here.
The extra reserve buoyancy would allow for additional time for the vessel to drift
before sinking. However, this would contradict the memories of William Alexander
who otherwise correctly recalled many details of the vessel. Additionally, it is not clear
why they would reduce the vessel’s stealth by doing so. Eyewitness testimony from the
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court of inquiry indicates that some of the deck seemed to be visible, but also that the
protrusions, probably the hatches or snorkel box, were making waves. Thus, it is hard
to say conclusively where the vessel was in the water.
• It is possible the crew was not incapacitated, and either helped propel the vessel to the
final sinking location or tried to slow the water flow in from the broken pipe. However,
if this was the case why were the keel weights not released, or more e↵ort made to
escape the slowly sinking vessel?
• It is possible the pipe break did not occur during the attack run but was a result of
damage during the many attempts to find the wreck with grapples after the attack.
However, this requires a second, independent, reason for the vessel’s loss to be postu-
lated.
6 Conclusions
A detailed naval architecture study of the H.L. Hunley reconciled the historical and archaeo-
logical record of the vessel with numerical simulation and engineering analysis. Detailed ge-
ometry studies, weight estimation, stability estimation, resistance and propulsion estimates
and model tests, and flowrate estimates from the damaged ballast fill pipe were carried out.
Overall, the historical record and archaeological interpretation are remarkably consistent with
the results of the simulations carried out. Specifically:
1. The vessel’s stability, based on the measured lines plan and detailed weight estimate,
appears to support the historical concept of operations. The vessel is stable throughout
the fit-out, loading, and submergence process. While not planned to operate as a
submarine on the final voyage, the vessel could submerge if needed based on its stability.
2. The vessel’s powering calculation estimates agree with the historical record, which
contained statements that the vessel could sprint between three and four knots, but
that missions were planned around the tide as the vessel would struggle to fight the
tide. The resistance and propulsion estimates and model test seem to confirm that
the vessel would be limited to speeds near one knot for prolonged operation, but could
sprint up to three or three and a half knots for short periods.
3. The broken ballast fill pipe would likely prove fatal to the submarine within a short
period of time. Without e↵orts to stem the flow of water, the vessel would leave the
surface within five minutes of the break occurring from a decks-awash draft.
4. The limited tidal data available for the night of the attack suggests that it would take
roughly 13 minutes to drift from the attack site to the final resting place of the Hunley.
The time to drift is more than twice the time estimated to sink from the fractured
ballast fill line. Thus, both all the crew being incapacitated and the pipe breaking
during the attack does not appear compatible with the final battlefield geometry.
Based on this analysis, it is possible to comment further on several of the initially proposed
scenarios:
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1. The Hunley was underpowered and unable to fight the tide to shore: From
the analysis, it is clear that the Hunley was unlikely to make much progress towards
the shore immediately after the attack. Given that the crew was experienced with the
vessel, and left with the tide, they most likely were not planning to immediately return.
This increases the likelihood that they might have been planning to hide until the tide
turned.
2. A grapefruit sized hole in the forward hatch caused significant flooding: No
further information on this scenario was generated.
3. The sheared ballast pipe caused enough flooding to cause instability and
ultimately sinking: The sheared ballast line continues to appear to be central to the
loss of the vessel, but its exact role and timing of the breach remains unclear. Based
on the results of this study, if the line sheared and no corrective action was taken, the
Hunley should have been found closer to the Housatonic. However, there is no other
evidence of corrective action taken on board the vessel - no e↵ort to release the keel
ballast weights can be seen from the condition of the wreck.
4. The broken rudder caused su cient loss in control that the Hunley drifted
till it sank: No further information on this scenario was generated in this work, the
current theory is that the final separation of the rudder occured after the vessel was on
the bottom.
5. The crew was knocked unconscious from the blast, and drifted until natural
leaks or other flooding caused them to sink: As investigated by NSWCCD, the
explosion alone did not seem to be severe enough to fully disable crew. Additionally,
the fast flooding rate from the sheared ballast pipe indicates that a straightforward
combination of scenarios three and five do not match the battlefield geometry.
6. Significant instability caused by water flooding over the bulkheads from the
ballast tanks caused the Hunley to sink: Based on the initial stability results, it
seems unlikely that the vessel lost stability immediately after the attack. The vessel has
a fair amount of reserve stability as long as additional water is not added to the hull,
and such an event would most likely have resulted in the Hunley being found closer to
the attack site.
7. Upon signaling a successful attack, a wave came over the forward hatch
causing the vessel to rapidly downflood: No further information on this scenario
was generated.
8. The Hunley crew retreated a safe distance and waited on the bottom, dying
from asphyxiation: Given the vessel’s powering characteristics, this scenario now
appears to be more likely. It appears that the vessel could not rapidly return to shore
against the tide, so the crew may have decided to wait until slack water. More work
on the air consumption of the crew would help further evaluate this scenario.
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9. The Hunley crew intentionally grounded the vessel to hide the secrets of it
construction from the Union Navy: No further information on this scenario was
generated.
10. The Hunley was unable to back away from the Housatonic after the attack,
and was trapped underneath the hull of the Housatonic: Not investigated as
does not fit with the battlefield archaeology; additionally the vessel appears to have a
strong sprint ability in the three to four knot range.
The review of the scenarios confirms a somewhat disappointing aspect of this work. While
the Hunley is much better understood technically after this work, a simple, coherent story
for explaining the vessel’s loss remains elusive. The sheared ballast pipe points to a rapid
sequence of events, but both the battlefield geometry and vessel’s powering indicate that
the Hunley may have intentionally been kept near the attack site by the vessel’s crew for a
prolonged period of time. One of the key challenges of working with the Hunley is that the
need to wait for the tide to change raises the probability that the crew may have simply run
out of breathable air while either actively attempting to escape or waiting for the change
of tide. This scenario is very di cult to disprove at this point, as the only evidence from
this sequence of events would have been in the soft tissue of the crew which has long since
disappeared.
There are also a number of limitations to the work presented here, as well as open questions
that could use further analysis:
1. The vessel’s resistance is highly influenced by skin friction: Especially at
lower speeds, the majority of the vessel’s drag was a result of skin friction. In the work
presented, modern friction line approaches were used to estimate this drag component.
However, if the actual vessel had a very rough outer surface, or had extensive biofouling
during the attack, the vessel’s resistance would be higher than that presented here. The
exact state of the vessel’s outer surface is not presently known.
2. A more accurate propeller model is still needed: When this work was completed,
the propeller was not yet de-concreted. Thus, only an approximate model of the pro-
peller could be made. A more refined model, based on the actual propeller geometry,
would be helpful.
3. A better understanding of the air consumption onboard would further help
understand the vessel’s final movements: With a better propeller model, a more
detailed calculation of the crew’s aerobic activity to move the vessel through the attack
sequence could be made. With the known internal volume of the vessel, the crew’s
ability to continue to receive the oxygen necessary to function after this sequence could
be evaluated, shedding more light on scenario eight.
4. The vessel’s position in the water is important to the final event sequence:
The analysis here was based on the assumption that the vessel operated low in the
water, with the hull’s top surface just awash. This matches the historical sketches of
the vessel with a waterline somewhat up on the conning towers. However, if the vessel
was higher in the water on the final night, a combination of scenarios three and five
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may again become practical. As the final depth of the vessel was most likely set by the
crew during the mission, the exact attack position may never be known. It is not clear
that there would be any advantage in operating the vessel at a lighter draft - stability
would increase, as would visibility but the stealth characteristics would be reduced.
5. The longitudinal stability of the vessel with crew moving should be inves-
tigated The inside of the submarine is very tight, making it di cult for the crew to
move fore and aft once in place. However, it is possible if the commander of the vessel
became disabled, the crew near the front may try to move forward to help operated
the ballast system or vessel controls. Also, if the ballast pipe burst, e↵orts to stop the
leak may have involved more than one person to help. The impact of such shifts on
the vessel’s longitudinal stability should be investigated.
Thus, more work exploration of the Hunley and its naval architecture characteristics is highly
recommended.
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Appendices
A Historical — and often inaccurate — descriptions of
the Hunley
Many resources over the years have presented a variety of information about the features of
the Hunley with no certain accuracy. At the current time, it is best to directly consult the
Warren Lasch Conservation Center to receive the latest archaeological findings on the vessel,
as they work with the preservation of the wreck. However, this appendix presents the histor-
ical sources in context, so that future researchers will have an understanding of the various
sources that have discussed the Hunley in the intervening decades. Note that the data in
this section are what the sources reported, work with the actual submarine has
not backed up many of these findings. Not every error is explicitly called out in this
section. There are three major resources that are continually cited as being the best resource
on the Hunley, and are referenced throughout this paper: the 1902 New Orleans Picayune
article written by William Alexander, the O cial Records of the Union and Confederate
Navies series: dated from 1863 to 1864; and finally the National Park Service (NPS) Site
Assessment completed in 1998.
An article published in the New Orleans Picayune [1] was written by the surviving Hun-
ley crew member, William Alexander, who did not sail on the final mission. He admits that
it had been 40 years and details are strictly from memory. Alexander describes the Hunley as
being created from a cylinder boiler, cut longitudinally in two pieces, then riveted together
with a 12 inch strip of plate. This would give the Hunley an overall dimension of 30 feet
long, by 4 feet wide, and 5 feet deep. Alexander describes the vessel being ballasted by flat
iron castings, fitted to the outside of the hull which could be detached by a square bolt.
The dive planes consisted of two 5 foot by 8 inch sections that had been cast, they were
operated by a lever amidships at the captain station. The rudder was operated by a wheel
(not yet located on the vessel) and levers connected to rods (only one rod appears on the
actual vessel) passing through the aft casting, controlled by the captain. The propeller was
an ordinary boat propeller attached to a crank shaft with eight stations, where the crew
would sit. The crank shaft was o↵set to the starboard side, and the men sat on the port side
of the crank. Alexander also mentions the propeller duct to prevent fouling. Three openings
were cut in the top of the hull, two for a fore and aft hatch, and one for a snorkel box with
two 4 foot tube attachments. He describes the open top bulkheads, and operating with a two
pump ballast system. The torpedo is described as a copper shell holding 90 pounds of black
powder, with a friction primer and set o↵ by a trigger. This was intended to float behind
the vessel on 200 feet of line, but the final design attached it to a 22 foot pine boom o↵ the
front of the bow. This description does not match the archaeology, which found a boom of a
di↵erent design. The sketch accompanying the description is presented in Figure 38 below.
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Figure 38: Drawing completed by William Alexander in 1902 accompanying the Picyune
article
Testing showed the vessel could make 4 miles per hour (3.47 knots) in relatively smooth
water [1]. Alexander also noted that it was very di cult to fight the tide back to shore, if
they missed the timing. The practiced operation of the submarine was to open the forward
and aft ballast tank valves, let the vessel sink to about halfway up the forward porthole, then
dive to about 6 feet below the surface. The submarine would come to the surface occasionally
to open the hatches and let fresh air into the main compartment. Finally, Alexander stated
that during operation, should the vessel ever be unable to surface, there was an agreement
between the crew members that they would open the seacocks and flood the compartment
to prevent dying from asphyxiation.
A report presented by two deserters of the Confederate Navy, stating that they had worked
closely with the Hunley during the first and second testing, shows details of the vessel to the
Union that warned them of the Torpedo boat [4]. They noted the vessel was about 35 feet
long with a height of 5 feet 5 inches, two man holes were spaced 12 or 14 feet apart. The
vessel was hand cranked and could make about 5 knots. They also noted that the vessel
would make it about a half mile on a dive before surfacing.
Lieutenant George Washington Gift, who was working on CSS Gaines had described the
submarine as ”a curious machine for destroying vessels” [3]. He described it as a high pres-
sure steam boiler about 4 foot diameter one way and 3 feet 6 inches the other way, drawn
closed at either end. He stated that the keel ballast was 4,000 pounds, making the vessel
steady to dive. On top there were two man hole plates with glass on top, just large enough
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for a man to fit through. The propeller was described as having a 3 feet 6 inch diameter (close
but not matching the actual propeller which is just over 31” in diameter), hand powered by
men turning a crankshaft. Lieutenant Gift noted that when the vessel was fully loaded, she
floated about half way out of the water, to sink the Hunley used two compartments which
filled with water. The air was supplied by pipes that turned up from a depth of 10 feet,
but with the air in the compartment the Hunley could last three hours, approximated as 15
miles. The torpedo is described as being 100 lbs of black powder attached to a plank of wood
floating 200 feet behind the vessel [3].
The design of the Hunley’s spar is discussed by Ragan’s work [4]. Unfortunately, the original
description has not been supported by recent work on the spar and charge. It is believed that
Ragan’s work primarily drew on an article in the October 1937 issue of U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings [2]. However, the description is outlined below as it was commonly referenced
before actual data from the vessel was available. This states a torpedo was a copper con-
tainer, designed such that could be mounted on a pole, and the detonated with a triggering
mechanism. The torpedo had a steel head that fit over a 10 foot spar attached to the bow.
The head of the torpedo also had a saw toothed projection that when rammed into an enemy
vessel would stick. The trigger is described as a coiled lanyard of 150 yards of rope that
would tighten then trip a trigger. Speculation suggests that the spar was introduced when
the Hunley was being moved to Sullivan’s Island, based on additional news articles from 1864
to 1870 [4]. Speculation also suggests that based on previous expense reports filed by Dixon,
that the trigger coil was probably 150 feet instead of 150 yards.
James McClintock describes the vessel in a letter to the British Navy as having an ellip-
tical shape with modeled ends. He states the vessel was built of 5/8 inch thick iron, the
vessel was 40 feet long top to bottom, 42 inches wide in the middle, and 48 inches high.
The Hunley was fit with a geared crank and propeller that was turned by eight people. The
sketch completed by James McClintock can be found in Figure 39 below.
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Figure 39: Sketch completed by James McClintock in 1872 accompanying his description of
the Hunley
The most accurate portrayal of the submarine is Conrad Chapman’s sketch made while the
vessel was on a pier or wharf after the seconding sinking [3] found in Figure 40. The location
of the main features are generally in the correct placement. The important di↵erence between
this painting and the Alexander sketch in Figure 38 is the fairness of the hull. Di↵erences
recorded after surveying the submarine include location of the spar torpedo and the aft
cutwater forward of the hatch [3]. However it is possible those were changed since the Hunley
was undergoing major modifications at this time.
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Figure 40: The painting completed in 1863 by Conrad Chapman depicting the submarine
after the second sinking
The pre-disturbance survey completed before recovering the Hunley presents more important
dimensions of the vessel. In-situ overall measured length was 39 feet 5 inches from the tip
of the upper bow to the aft most part of the upper hull. Profile measurements show 3 feet
10 inches wide and 4 feet 3 inches from the hull top to the bottom of the keel ballast. These
are quite close to the final dimensions of 40 feet long, 3’ 6” wide and 4’ 0” tall found after
recovery during conservation. The keel ballast is four and a half inches thick, with a concave
shape fitting the hull. The iron strip running longitudinally along the side was measured to
be about 9 inches tall.
To properly verify the Hunley, the NPS located the forward hatch and cutwater, snorkel
box, aft hatch, port dive plane, keel ballast, and deadlights along the length of the hull [3].
The hatches were observed at 16 feet 3 inches apart, with the hatches opening toward each
other. They are two feet long at the base, 1 foot 2 inches at the centerline or 1 foot 4 inches
on the outside edge. The snorkel box is located 4 inches after of the forward hatch, and
consists of a rectangular box about 1 foot 2 inches wide, 1 foot 3 inches long and 8 inches
high. Each side had a stu ng box that was 11 inches long and 5 inches wide. The cutwater
is identified as a 3 foot 4 inch long section that is 9 inches tall at the forward hatch. A second
cutwater, believed for the aft hatch, was found near the submarine during later excavations.
The deadlights were spaced evenly along the hull starting 2 feet 6 inches aft of the snorkel
box. The port dive plane was measured as 6 feet 10 inches, with a 3 inch diameter pivot
point. The width is about 8 inches with a thickness between 1 and 1/4 inch and 1 and 1/2
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inches. The drawing accompanying this description can be found in Figure 41.
Figure 41: Drawing of the main features of the Hunley as discovered during the pre-
disturbance survey in 1998
Important hull damage that was found during the survey shows that there was a grapefruit
sized hole that is in the forward part of the forward hatch. This is believed to have been
involved with the sinking, as initial corrosion analysis shows similar results to the rest of the
hull [3].
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Introduction
The CSS H. L. Hunley was a submarine-type naval vessel operated by the Confederate States of
America during the American Civil War. The recent finding and restoration of its remains has prompted
interest in its hydrodynamic characteristics in order to potentially better understand its operation, and
ultimately its demise.
A physical hydrodynamic testing program of the CSS Hunley was commissioned at the University
of Michigan Marine Hydrodynamics Laboratory (UM MHL). This report presents the findings of the
hydrodynamic model testing and the resulting full-scale hull performance prediction.
Test Program
A one-third (1/3) scale model was designed and constructed based upon the current understanding
of  the  CSS Hunley’s  design,  which  is  assumed to  be  39.5 feet  long,  3.83 feet  in  width,  displace
approximately 7.5 short tons and operate at a top speed of 4.0 knots utilizing a hand-cranked propeller.
A rendering of the side view is shown in Figure 1. In this view, the bow is to the right. Cylindrical
conning towers and a ventilation box are located on the top and a weighted steel keel is located on the
hull bottom. A dark horizontal line near the top indicates one of the estimated running conditions. The
grid shown is drawn full-scale with major grid lines indicating feet.
Figure 1: Rendering of CSS Hunley model hull design side view
The model was constructed of wood with an interior filled with steel and lead ballast to achieve
the appropriate trim conditions. The model was sealed with an epoxy coating and painted. It is believed
that the boat had rivet heads and metal plate joining seams exposed on the exterior of the hull; no
attempt was made to recreate the exterior surface to that level of detail. However, the model exterior
paint surface was not finished to the typical ‘hydrodynamically smooth’ condition, in order to provide
some level of roughness exposed to the passing fluid.
The model was secured to the UM MHL Physical Model Basin powered carriage utilizing a force
dynamometer. The model was towed through the water at a variety of speeds and draft conditions and
the resulting hydrodynamic drag on the hull was measured by the force dynamometer.
In addition to changing the hull ballast condition and speed, tests were conducted both with and
without the hull control surfaces in order to quantify their hydrodynamic impact on the hull. The model
test matrix is shown in Table 1.
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Table 1: CSS Hunley model hull test matrix
Figure 2: CSS Hunley model at static lightship condition (test cases 1 and 2)
Figure 3: CSS Hunley model at 3.0 knots scaled speed for lightship condition (test cases 1 and 2)
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Figure 4: CSS Hunley model at static completely submerged condition (test cases 3 and 4)
Figure 5: CSS Hunley model at 3.0 knots scaled speed for completely submerged condition (test cases 3 and 4)
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Figure 6: CSS Hunley model at static deck submerged condition (test cases 5 and 6)
Figure 7: CSS Hunley model at 3.0 knots scaled speed for deck submerged condition (test cases 5 and 6)
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Test Results
For each test condition, based on the independent variables of immersion depth, control surface
implementation  and  forward  speed,  the  hull  resistance  (drag)  was  recorded  utilizing  a  National
Instruments data acquisition system. For the following analyses, forward speed and drag was averaged
while the hull was moving at a steady state forward speed.
 The following hull and test conditions apply to the analysis, as shown in Table 2:
Table 2: Values used for the drag prediction analysis
 The average model steady state forward speed,  VM,  and total resistance, RTM, are shown in the
second and third columns of Tables 3, 4 and 5. The columns further to the right in blue are calculated
values using Froude’s Method to calculate the predicted full scale ship resistance, RTS, and effective
power, PES. As expected, the total drag on the hull increases with speed, immersion and total surface
area (by including the control surfaces).
The following abbreviations are used in Tables 2, 3 and 4:
VS Velosity of the full scale ship
VM Velocity of the model
Fn Froude number of the model: VM/(LMg)
0.5
RTM Total resistance of the model
CTM Coefficient of total resistance of the model: RTM/(0.5rVM
2SM)
RnM Reynolds number of the model: VMLM/nM
CFM Coefficient of friction of the model (ITTC-78): 0.075/(Log10(RnM)-2.0)
2
CR Coefficient of residual resistance (same for ship and model): CTM-CFM
RnS Reynolds number of the full scale ship: VSLS/nS
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CFS Coefficient of friction of the full scale ship: 0.075/(Log10(RnS)-2.0)
2
CTS Coefficient of total resistance of the full scale ship: CFS+CR
RTS Total resistance of the model: CTS(0.5rVS
2SS)
PES Total effective power required to propel the full scale ship: RTSVS
n Water kinematic viscosity (m2/s) – temperature and salinity dependent
r Water density (kg/m3) – temperature and salinity dependent
g Acceleration due to gravity (9.806 m/s2)
SM Wetted surface area of the model hull (m
2) for the given test condition
SS Wetted surface area of the full scale ship hull (m
2) for the given test condition
LM Length of the model hull
LS Length of the full scale ship
Table 3: Test results for model at lightship condition (cases 1 and 2)
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Table 4: Test results for model at completely submerged condition (cases 3 and 4)
Table 5: Test results for the model at deck submerged condition (cases 5 and 6)
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Figure 8: Plot of the model test results for each of the conditions
Figure 9: Plot of the predicted full scale hull drag characteristics for each of the conditions
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